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REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMM ITTEE ON THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF
PHILADELPHIA COUNTY.
The movement toward judicial reform took shape at Phi!adel-
phia last spring in the appointlent of a special committee by the
Law Association to consider what measures should be adopted to
ensure a more speedy trial of causes in local Courts. On Decem-
ber 3rd last the Law Association adopted a report presented by
this committee whose chairman is Mr. George Wentworth Carr.
The committee is to be continued with power to cause to be intro-
duced into the next session of the General Assembly, and to take
all proper measures to secure the passage of, an act adding one
judge to each of the five Courts of Common Pleas of Philadel-
phia, and to secure an amendment to the Constitution providing
for the establishment of a Municipal Court along the lines of the
Chicago Municipal Court.
G.E.S.
THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF SURETIES FOR TIlE ACTS OF A PUBLIC
OFFICER DONE COLORE OFFICII.
In the recent case of Jersey City v. Schoppe, 82 At. (N. J.),
913, where a constable was directed by a writ of attachment to
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attach the goods of the defendant named therein and accepted from
the defendant the amount of the plaintiff's claim and costs, paid
the same to the plaintiff's attorney and thereafter the defendant
in the writ succeeded upon the trial of the action, and the con-
stable failed to return to him the money deposited, it was held
in a suit upon the constable's bond for a forfeiture thereof that
the acts of the constable were not performed in the furtherance
of his duty as prescribed by law, but were performed unofficially,
or colore off cii, and that his sureties were therefore not subjected
to liability ol the bond.
The distinction between acts of an officer done colore officii.
and virtute officii, is stated in People v. Schuyler, 4 N. Y., 187,
"Acts done virtute officii are where they are within the authority
of the officer but in doing them he exercises that authority im-
properly or abuses the confidence which the law reposes in him;
while acts done colore officii are where they are of such a nature
that his office gives him no authority to do them."
The jurisdictions which support the doctrine of the principal
case say that the contract of the sureties is to be strictly con-
strued; that they are not liable for anything not within the letter
of their contract.
The Court in the case of Bank v. Zeigler, 49 Mich., 157, states,
"The obligation is strictissimi jritis, and nothing is to be taken by
construction against the obligors. They have consented to be
bound to a certain extent only, and their liability must be found
within the terms of that consent."
The sureties do not bind themselves to protect the public against
every act of their principal, nor do they become his sureties to
keep the peace. State v. Conover, 4 - (N. Y.), 228.
The theory on which the doctrine of the principal case is based
is well stated in the case of Inman v. Sherrill, 1 i6 Pac., 426. The
Court says, "Where an officer, while doing an act within the limits
of his official authority, exercises such authority improperly or
exceeds his official powers or abuses an official discretion vested
in him, he becomes liable on his official bond to the person injured.
But where he acts without any process and without authority of
his office in doing such act, he is not considered an officer, but a
personal trespasser."
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The fact that the officer represents himself to be acting of-
ficially, or that he assumes to act virtute officii, does not stop his
sureties from showing the contrary. Governor v. Pearce, 31 Ala.,
465.
Many cases which are quoted as following the doctrine of the
principal case would seem to regard certain acts as not having
been done colore officii which in other jurisdictions might be so
construed. In the case of State v. Clausineirr, 154 Ind., 599, it
is held that a sheriff does not act officially in sending photographs
of an accused person to police departments, etc., whereby the ac-
cused is held up to the world as a criminal, and his sureties are
not liable on his official bond for such acts.
An official bond is not an engagement for general good behavior
on the part of the principal, nor an undertaking that he shall in
all things keep the peace, but rather a limited and literal contract
to the effect that such officer will not violate some duty resting
on him as a public officer. Gerber v. Ackley, 37 Wis., 43.
On the other hand, it is held by many Courts that the sureties
on the bond of such an officer are liable not only for his defaults
in acts done virtute officii, but also for his acts done colore officii.
It is the undertaking of the sureties that their principal will
well and faithfully execute the duties of his office, and he cannot
be deemed to have done so when he seizes the property of a
stranger or levies upon property exempt from execution. There
is, therefore, such a breach of the condition of the bond as renders
the sureties liable. Mechem on Public Officers, Sec. 284. It is
stated in Campbell v. People, 154 Ill., 595, that the object of re-
quiring official bonds is to obtain indemnity against the use of an
official position for the wrongful acts done under color of office.
By an official act is not meant a lawful act of the officer in the
service of process. If so the sureties would never be liable. It
means any act done by the officer in his official capacity, under
color or by virtue of his office. Turner v. Sisson, 137 Mass., 191.
Of course, there is no doubt that if there is no connection be-
tween this wrongful act and his official capacity or line of duty,
his bondsmen are not liable. Greenberg v. the People, 225 Ill.,
174.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lamman v. Feusier, iii
U. S., 17, reviews the authorities and enunciates the doctrine that
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the wrongful acts of a public officer colore officii are official acts
for which the sureties upon his bond are liable.
The Courts which hold that.the sureties are liable for the act
of the officer if done colore officii are not uniform as to the liabil-
ity of the surety if the officer acts under a void writ.
The proper criterion is stated to be, "That when the act of the
officer is done not virtute officii, but colore, the bondsmen are liable
only when the illegality is an abuse of authority as distinguished
from a usurpation." State v. Dierker, IOI Mo. App., 636. The
decision in this case was that the sureties were not liable for the
reason that the arrest complained of was not colore officii,
although the officer thought he was acting officially, the arrest
having been made without a warrant for a misdemeanor not com-
mitted in his view, and his bond having been conditioned merely
for the faithful performance of his duty.
But it was held in the case of State v. Edmundson, 70 Mo.
App., 172, that where a sheriff levied on the property of another,
believing a mere memorandum of costs gave him authority to do
so, it amounted to an act done colore officii, for which his sure-
ties were liable.
The Supreme Court in the case of Lammon v. Feusier, supra,
which is a leading case supporting the doctrine contra to that of
the principal case, is cited in the case of Lee v. Charnley, 129 N.
W. (N. D.), 448, as supporting the conclusion that color of office
does not imply necessarily that an officer has a valid writ, or in
fact, any writ at all.
But Judge Thayer in the case of Chandler v. Rutherford, IOI
Fed., 774, says: "To constitute color of office such as will render
an officer's sureties liable for his wrongful acts, something else
must be shown besides the fact that in doing the act complained
of the officer claimed to be acting in an official capacity. If he
is armed with no writ, or if the writ under which he acts is utterly
void, and if there is at the time no statute which authorizes the
act to be done without process, then there is no such color of
office as will enable him to impose a liability upon the sureties in
his official bond."
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In some of the States the matter has been made the subject of
express statutory regulation. Thus in Alabama it has been
enacted that the sureties are liable for acts done colore officii as
well as acts done virtute officii.
The doctrine of the principal case is not only contra to the
great preponderance of authority, but cannot be supported by the
soundest reasons of policy. Mechem, Sec. 284.
The almost uniform doctrine of the Courts is that the sureties
ol the bond of a public officer are liable not only for his default
in acts done virtute officii, but also for his acts done colore officii.
LIABILITY OF THE INDORSER ON A NOTE WHEN THE HOLDER FAILS
TO PRESENT THE NOTE, WHEN DUE, TO THE MAKER. PRE-
SENTMENT AND DEMAND BY TELEPHONE.
On the day a note matured, made payable at the maker's resid-
ence, the cashier of the bank called the maker tip at his residence
by telephone, and stated to him that the bank held his note for
collection. The cashier described the note which he had in his
possession at the time, and asked the maker what he would do
with the note. The maker replied that he would not pay it. The
note was protested without further presentment, and notice of
protest mailed to the defendant, now sued as indorser. The
upper court reversing the lower court held, that the demand and
presentment by telephone was inadequate to hold those second-
arily liable. Gilpin v. Savage, 201 N. Y., 167.
The plaintiff in the principal case is seeking to hold the in-
dorser, who pleads lack of presentation and demand upon the
maker. Sec. 133 of the Neg. Inst. Law of New York, provides
that an instrument is presented at the proper place when pre-
sented at the place of payment specified therein. If due present-
ment is not made at the place specified in the note the indorser is
discharged from all liability. The question before the court is
whether from the facts and circumstances of the case, sufficient
presentment and demand has been made upon the maker to sat-
isfy the statute and render the indorser liable.
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The relation between maker and indorser of a note, or nego-
tiable paper, is a contractual relation. The effect of the statute
is to make the indorsement conditional upon due presentment,
demand, and notice. The indorser may waive this condition; it
would be a solecism however to permit another person to waive
away the rights of the indorser. Therefore if one indorser
writes a waiver over his name it does nct affect another, and any
agreement between the maker and acceptor will not bind the in-
dorser, unless he adopts it as his act.
When presentment of a bill or note, at maturity has been dis-
pensed with by prior agreement between the parties entitled to
require it, the holder is cxcused for failure to make it. The
waiver may be in writing, or verbally, or inferred from the words,
or acts, of the parties. Sometimes the waiver is embodied in the
instrument itself, in such cases the waiver is a part of the con-
tract of every party who signs it.
The right to have the note presented for payment at the place
specified therein is a personal right of the indorser and cannot
be waived by another party. When not expressly or impliedly
waived it is the duty of the holder to go through all the formalities
in order to hold those secondarily liable. It has been well estab-
lished that presentment of a bill, or note, and demand of payment
should be made by the actual exhibition of the instrument either
by the holder, or his authorized agent, in order to charge those
secondarily liable. Presentment to the maker enables him to judge
as to the genuineness of the instrument; of the right of the holder,
to receive payment; and enables him to reclaim possession of it
upon payment of that amount. As a general rule, if the holder
does not produce the note, the maker may decline to pay it until
presented. In the case of Warning v. Belts, 90 Va. 46, the court
said that if on demand of payment, the exhibition of the instru-
ment is not asked for, and the party to whom demand is made
declines on other grounds, a formal presentment by the actual
exhibition of the paper is considered as waived. This seems to be
the general rule in cases where the holder has the note in his pos-
session when he makes a personal demand for payment.
Any material alteration of the indorser's contract or non-com-
pliance with its terms, releases him from all liability. In the case
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of Woodworth v. Bank, 19 Johns, 391, it was held that the addi-
tion to a promissory note payable generally, of words specifying
a particular place of payment, was a material alteration of the
contract into which the indorser had entered which discharged
him from all liability as indorser. In the case of Parker v. Stowd,
98 N. Y., 379, it was held that a demand of payment at the place
named in the note is an essential part of the contract so far as
the indorser is concerned, no right of action accruing to the holder
until after demand has been made in strict compliance with the
terms of the contract, and due notice of default given.
The decision of the principal case seems to be justified on princi-
ple. A valid presentment consists of something more than a
mere demand. There must be an actual exhibition of the instru-
ment itself, or the holder of the note should have it in his pos-
session ready to deliver it upon payment. This rule implies phy-
sical presentment of the note to the maker before the indorser
can be held. Were this not so, a holder in New York could de-
mand payment of the maker in Chicago by telephone, defeating
the right of indorser.
DOES MARRIAGE ALONE HITMANCIIPATH. A MALE MINOR ?
This question has been presented to the Michigan court and
answered in the negative, in the case of Austin v. Austin, 132 N.
W., 495. The defendant in this case was committed for contempt
in not obeying an order of court, ordering temporary alimony to
be paid by the defendant to his wife, who was bringing an action
against him for absolute divorce on the ground of extreme cru-
elty. Both parties were still minors. They had lived since their
marriage on the farm of the defendant's father. The defense
set up in the lower court, but not allowed by it, was that the de-
fendant had no property and had never been emancipated, so his
father was entitled to and did receive all the defendant's wages-
making it impossible for him to obey the court's order. The Cir-
cuit Court ordered him to pay, saying it was his duty to support
his wife, and pay the expense of the litigation, notwithstanding
his minority. From this order he appealed, and the Supreme
Court reversed the decision, accepting the defense. The opinion
is very brief and unsatisfactory. The judge reading the unanimous
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decision of the court, said: "The defendant has not been emanci-
cipated unless the marriage of itself effected an emancipation.
If this were a case of first impression, I should agree with the
Circuit Judge, that the lawful marriage of minors emancipates
both; but I have reluctantly come to the conclusion that such a
view is foreclosed by the decision of this court in People v. Todd,
6i Mich., 234. That opinion can only be sustained upon the
ground that marriage alone does not emancipate a male minor."
This is the entire opinion; no reason is given except stare decisis,
against their better opinions now. Nor are any cases cited in
the opinion but the single Michigan case supra.
The case they follow so "reluctantly" in the principal case was
decided in i886, and was not a clear cut decision, nor deserving
of their strict adherence, against their own impressions and the
weight of authority. In this case, Todd, the minor husband, was
being prosecuted criminally as a disorderly person under a statute,
for not supporting his wife, although it was alleged he was able
to do so. The case was decided against the state in a very scanty
opinion, the court merely saying :--"Upon a careful scrutiny of
the testimony we discover no legal testimony to show that re-
spondent was emancipated or that he owned property." As this
ability to support was essential for the state to prove, the case
was dismissed. But in this case, the court says the marriage is
being contested as void for duress in another action. So a legal
valid marriage was not proven, so as to raise clearly the question
of its effect. The state did not even prove Todd was earning
anything, or had any property which his emancipation would
affect, if there had been an emancipation. On the whole, it seems
as though this case is too doubtful and vague on this point to bind
the court slavishly twenty-five years later, against its own good
judgment and practically the entire weight of judicial authority in
this country and in England.
It is to be kept in mind all through this discussion that in the
principal case the emancipation was only considered as to its effect
against the father-as to his rights to the earnings of his son.
As to its effects as to third parties, in removing the disabilities
of a minor, in respect to contracts, deeds, etc., courts have not
gone so far, nor have they agreed. Texas says it emancipates
either a male or female minor from parental control-as it did
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under both Spanish and Mexican law-but does not remove disa-
bilities of a minor as to contracts and real property. Burr v.
Wilson, 18 Tex., 367; Grayson v. Lofland, 21 Tex., Civ. App.
503; Trammel v. Trammel, 20 Tex., 406. By a Texas statute of
1848, a minor female who marries is thereby made of full age,
but this statute does not cover males. Burr v. Wilson, supra.
Nor does marriage give a male minor "political or municipal
rights" of an adult. Inhabitants of Taunton v. Inhabitants of
Plymouth, 15 Mass., 203. But this line of cases does not support
the principal one, where question was only as to the son's right to
his earnings as against his father.
There is no question but at common law the father was entitled
absolutely to all the earnings of his minor children, unless eman-
cipated. i Blackstone 453; 2 Kent Com., 193. And as little ques-
tion that after a legal emancipation the father had no pecuniary
interest in his child's earnings. Morse v. Welton, 6 Conn., 547;
Lyon v. Bolling, 14 Ala., 753; Jenison v. Craves, 2 Blackf., (Ind.)
440; Bell v. Bumpus, 63 Mich., 375; Corey v. Corey, 19 Pick.,
(Mass.), 29.
Nor does there seem to have been any question as to the eman-
cipation of a female minor by marriage alone. Rex v. Wilming-
ton, 5 B. & Ald., 525; Charlestown v. Boston, 13 Mass., 469; State
v. Lowell, 78 Minn., 166; Porch v. Pries, 18 N. J., Eq., 204; Al-
drich v. Bennett, 63 N. H., 415. This distinction as to the effect
of marriage of a male and female minor is probably due to the
fact that at common law the wife came under the dominion of
her husband, and it is clear that any control by her father after
marriage would be impossible and against public policy.
The courts are practically unanimous in giving like effect to the
marriage of a male minor, contrary to the principal case. Schouler
says :--"Marriage of an infant with his parent's consent removes
him from parental control and, we may presume, gives him a right
as against the father to apply all his earnings to the support of
his family. Marriage without the consent of the parent ought to
confer the same right upon an infant, inasmuch as the claims of
wife and child in either case are paramount." Schouler, Domes-
tic Relations, Sec. 267.. Long, Domestic Relations, Sec. 167, says
"the marriage of an infant son with his parent's consent" eman-
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cipates him. These authorities draw the distinction as to the
effect of parent's consent, relying on the decision in White v.
Henry, 24 Me. 531 (1845). In this case it was held clearly that
the marriage of a minor son against his father's consent-he had
run away to Connecticut to get married:--did not take away the
father's right to his son's earnings, although they were living
apart. The court said such a marriage was against an express
Maine statute and against public policy, for it would encourage
escape from parental control and encourage improvident, early
marriages. But they admit in this case, that marriage with consent
would emancipate the son as to his earnings. Only one other State
has been found drawing this distinction-Louisiana, which drew it
in the case of a minor daughter even as late as 1901-2 in Guillebert
v. Grenier, 107 La., 614; in the case of a minor son, Maillefer v.
Saillet, 4 La. Ann., 375; Balin v. LeBlanc, 12 La. Ann., 367;
Clement v. Wafer, 12 La. Ann., 602. This court assigns the
same reasons for it as does the Maine court. But this court is
clear on the point that marriage with the consent of parents
emancipates both a minor son and daughter, as to parental con-
trol of earnings. Wilcox v. Henderson, 7 Robin (La.), 338.
The Massachusetts court in Commonwealth v. Graham, 157
Mass., 73, distinctly repudiated any such distinction, discussing
White v. Henry, supra, and repudiating it. They place it on the
broad, logical grounds that by the valid marriage the son becomes
the head of a new family, and "his new relations to his wife and
children create obligations and duties which require him to be
master of himself, his time, his labor, earnings and conduct. These
considerations make it necessary to hold that an infant husband
is entitled to his own wages so far as they are necessary for his
own support and that of his wife and children, even if married
without his father's consent."
The principal case cannot seek to come under the Maine and
Louisiana cases as to consent, for in the principal case there is no
question of consent raised at all. The minor husband and wife lived
with the son's father continually, so it seems as though the father
must have consented. At least the question was not raised, nor
were these cases cited.
Unquestionably the authorities are solidly against the principal
case when reduced to its simplest terms, namely, that marriage
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of a male minor with consent does not entitle him to his earnings.
The English authorities are settled that marriage alone emanci-
pates a male minor, since 1789 at least, when Lord Kenyon in two
pauper settlement cases laid down the four ways in which eman-
cipation might be brought about-"(i) -He must have obtained a
settlement for himself, (2) or become the head of a family, (3)
or at most he must have arrived at the age when he may set up
in the world for himself"; (King v. Inhabitants of Offchurch, 3
Term Rep., 114); or (4) "having contracted a relation which
was inconsistent with the idea of his being in a subordinate sit-
uation in his father's family." King v. Inhabitants of Wilton, 7
Term Rep., 355. Marriage was surely meant by (2) and perhaps
would come under (4) also. If there was any doubt as to the
English rule, it was settled in the case of King v. Inhabitants of
Wilmington, 5 B. & Ald., 525, where the court said: "It is of im-
portance to lay down a general rule for the guidance of magis-
trates on this subject of emancipation and the best which I can
suggest is that during the minority of a child there can be no
emancipation unless he marries, and so becomes himself the head
of a family, or contracts some other relation so as wholly and
permanently to exclude the parental control." King v. Inhabitants
of Etherton, i East 525, lays down the same principle as to mar-
riages.
One of the best and most logical opinions of the American
courts, directly contrary to the principal case, and illustrating the
reasoning on which the better rule is founded, is by the Missis-
sippi court in Dick v. Grissom, i Freem. Chan., 428. The action
was to set aside a deed between defendant and his son as fraud-
ulent against creditors. It was alleged to have been given for
services performed by the son for the father. The court said:-
"It is in evidence, however, that during the period of the services,
he was a married man; this was of itself a legal emancipation, and
entitled him to the proceeds of his labor independent of any act
of emancipation on the part of the father. When a man marries
he necessarily takes upon himself the care and support of his
family, and it is essential to the very structure and independence
of civil society that he should, notwithstanding his minority, have
control over his own actions and be entitled to apply the proceeds
of his labor to the support of his family; and so I understand the
law to have been settled." In Holland v. Beard, 59 Miss., 161,
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the court reasserted its views strongly in the same direction.
"From the moment of marriage the husband and wife assume
towards each other, duties in the performance of which society is
vitally interested, and which it will not permit to be hampered or
obstructed by the assertion of conflicting rights by others."
This majority rule is laid down in the following cases also-
Vanatta v. Carr, 229 l1l., 47 (1907) ; Town of Sherburne v. Town
of Hartland, 37 Vt., 529. The latter case was approved of and
followed in Town of Northfield v. Town of Brookfield, 50 Vt.,
62, and even more clearly in Town of Craftsbury v. Town of
Greensboro, 66 Vt., 585. New Hampshire laid down the majo-
rity rule in one settlement case; Fremont v. Sandown, 56 N. H.,
300; and in Aldrich v. Bennett, 63 N. H., 415, where they said the
same result followed whether parent consented or not. Roach &
McLean v. Quick, 9 Wend., (N. Y.), 238, lays down the same
rule in holding a minor husband liable for the debts contracted
by his wife before the marriage, as does also the case of State ex
rel. Scott v. Lowell, 78 Minn., 166.
It thus seems as though the Supreme Court of Michigan in the
principal case followed out the rule of stare decisis too rigidly,
following a case which it could seemingly have explained differ-
ently. It is clearly contrary to the weight of authority, reason
and logic, against public policy, and decidedly against the better
judgment of the court.
